- Liittynyt
- 15.1.2007
- Viestejä
- 3 599
Mutta niin, voisi ajatella, että pankit tulevaisuudessa kyllä osaavat kerätä isommat puskurit. Sääntelyssä on se ongelma monesti, että se sääntelee ongelmaa mitä liki kaikki osaavat jo varoa.
En ole tässä tapauksessa lainkaan samaa mieltä.
"The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933... included banking reforms, some of which were designed to control speculation. [...] Provisions that prohibit a bank holding company from owning other financial companies were repealed on November 12, 1999, by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
"The banking industry had been seeking the repeal of Glass-Steagall since at least the 1980s. In 1987 the Congressional Research Service prepared a report which explored the case for preserving Glass-Steagall and the case against preserving the act.
The argument for preserving Glass-Steagall (as written in 1987):
1. Conflicts of interest characterize the granting of credit — lending — and the use of credit — investing — by the same entity, which led to abuses that originally produced the Act.
2. Depository institutions possess enormous financial power, by virtue of their control of other people’s money; its extent must be limited to ensure soundness and competition in the market for funds, whether loans or investments.
3. Securities activities can be risky, leading to enormous losses. Such losses could threaten the integrity of deposits. In turn, the Government insures deposits and could be required to pay large sums if depository institutions were to collapse as the result of securities losses.
4. Depository institutions are supposed to be managed to limit risk. Their managers thus may not be conditioned to operate prudently in more speculative securities businesses. An example is the crash of real estate investment trusts sponsored by bank holding companies (in the 1970s and 1980s).
The argument against preserving the Act (as written in 1987):
1. Depository institutions will now operate in “deregulated” financial markets in which distinctions between loans, securities, and deposits are not well drawn. They are losing market shares to securities firms that are not so strictly regulated, and to foreign financial institutions operating without much restriction from the Act.
2. Conflicts of interest can be prevented by enforcing legislation against them, and by separating the lending and credit functions through forming distinctly separate subsidiaries of financial firms. [En tajua tuon boldatun osan pointtia?]
3. The securities activities that depository institutions are seeking are both low-risk by their very nature, and would reduce the total risk of organizations offering them -- by diversification.
4. In much of the rest of the world, depository institutions operate simultaneously and successfully in both banking and securities markets. Lessons learned from their experience can be applied to our national financial structure and regulation."
Ja pieni vilkaisu siihen mitä LTCM:n perustaja on oppinut noin 15 vuodessa...
"LTCM was founded in 1994 by John Meriwether ... Initially enormously successful with annualized returns of over 40% (after fees) in its first years, in 1998 it lost $4.6 billion in less than four months following the Russian financial crisis and became a prominent example of the risk potential in the hedge fund industry. The fund folded in early 2000. [...]
After helping unwind LTCM, Meriwether launched JWM Partners. Haghani, Hilibrand, Leahy, and Rosenfeld all signed up as principals of the new firm. By December 1999, they had raised $250 million for a fund that would continue many of LTCM's strategies—this time, using less leverage. This leverage was supposed to be USD 15 or less for every dollar of net assets.
Unfortunately, with the Credit Crisis, JWM Partners LLC has been hit with 44 percent loss since September 2007 to February 2009 in its Relative Value Opportunity II fund. As such, JWM Hedge Fund is to be shut down in July 2009."