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- Liittynyt
- 21.7.2004
- Viestejä
- 23 358
ISW:ltä mielenkiintoisia pointteja. Jos tuo ensimmäinen puolustuslinja pettää, niin joukot joutuisivat vetäytymään ilman reservien tukea ja se voi johtaa katastrofiin. Tosin tilanne voi olla myös se, että Venäjä tapattaa nuo joukot ennemmin kuin antaa heidän vetäytyä.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2023
The deployment of almost the entirety of the Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces and extensive SMD elements to the frontline in southern Ukraine suggests that Russian defenses in southern Ukraine may be brittle. Mashovets’ report suggests that the only reserve that the Russian military maintains in southern Ukraine consists of elements of the 29th Combined Arms Army – the Eastern Military District’s smallest combined arms army that has only one maneuver brigade: the 36thMotorized Rifle Brigade. Elements of the 36th Motorized Rifle Brigade participated in the Battle of Kyiv in early 2022 and fought near Vuhledar in early 2023 and are thus likely degraded.[15]
Russian defenses in southern Ukraine, while formidable, are not insurmountable. Russian forces in southern Ukraine would likely have to fall back on prepared defensive positions without significant support from operational reserves if Ukrainian forces achieved an operational breakthrough. Withdrawal in contact is an exceedingly difficult military task, and it is unclear that Russian forces in contact would be able to successfully withdraw from their first lines to other prepared lines in good order, especially if those forces - and the forces behind them in echelon - are worn-down and unsupported. ISW previously assessed that Ukrainian forces are likely conducting a gradual effort to systematically degrade Russian combat power in southern Ukraine over time, increasing the brittleness of the Russian defenses.[16]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-july-7-2023